Trade statistics portray China as the largest exporter of high-tech products. This paper demonstrates that China's leading position in high-tech exports is a myth created by outdated trade statistics, which are inconsistent with trade based on global supply chains. Current trade statistics mistakenly credit entire values of assembled high-tech products to China, thus greatly inflating its exports. This paper adopted a value-added approach to more accurately measure high-tech exports, revealing that, in 2009, China's valueadded accounted for only about 3 percent of the total value attributed for its exports of iPhones and laptop PCs. Furthermore, if assembly is the only source of value-added by Chinese workers, in terms of technological contribution, these assembled high-tech exports are indifferent from labor-intensive products, and so they should be excluded from the high-tech classification.
Introduction
China's economic miracle in the last three decades has been driven by extraordinary exports growth. With US$ 2 trillion exports in 2012, China surpassed Germany and the United States to emerge as the largest exporting country in the world. Besides surging export volumes, the structure of exports has also changed signiªcantly. In particular, the share of labor-intensive products has gradually declined while that of high-tech products has increased substantially. Exports of high-tech products, such as information communication technology (ICT) products grew at a much faster pace than overall exports. By 2007, China accounted for 23 percent of global ICT exports (Athukorala 2011) . Total exports of high-tech products in 2010 surged to US$ 492 billion, accounting for one third of China's total manufacturing exports (Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology 2011). The apparent sophistication of China's export bundle is beyond what is normally observed at its income level, with its signiªcant achievement in ICT exports, in particular in mobile phones, laptop computers, and digital cameras, triggering academic debates about "what's so special about China's exports?" (Rodrik 2006 ).
According to a report by the European Commission, China has become the world's largest high-tech exporting country, producing 16.9 percent of global high-tech exports, followed by the United States at 16.8 percent, the EU28 1 at 15 percent, and Japan at eight percent (Meri 2009 ). In addition, the United States, an undisputable technology leader, has been running trade deªcits with China in advanced technology products (ATP). Statistics published by the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that in 2010 the U.S. trade deªcit with China in ATP grew to a record high of US$ 94 billion, accounting for 35 percent of its trade deªcit with China (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).
Until recently, China was not a major player in the global market for high-tech products; labor-intensive products dominated its exports. In 1995, China accounted for just 2.1 percent of global high-tech exports and its total high-tech exports were equivalent to only 8 percent of that of the United States (Meri 2009 ). With a population of 1.3 billion, it is no surprise that China has dominated the global market of labor-intensive products such as shoes, toys, ready-made garments, and so forth. It is astonishing that only a decade later China had apparently transformed into the world's number one exporter of high-tech products. Producing high-tech products, especially for the competitive international market, requires substantial investment in research and technology (R&D) and long-term accumulation of production knowhow. It is true that China's R&D intensity increased from 0.6 percent of gross domestic products (GDP) in 1996 to 1.7 percent in 2009, but still it is low compared with the 2.8 percent of the United States and 3.3 percent of Japan (OECD 2011). So, is China really a high-tech export champion?
This paper investigates the nature of China's impressive achievements in high-tech exports in the context of global supply chains. Speciªcally, it focuses on tasks performed by Chinese workers in manufacturing high-tech exports, the role of foreign-invested ªrms, and the extent of China's contribution to the value-added of these products. This reality check suggests that the myth of China's leading position in high-tech exports has little to do with technological advances in indigenous Chinese companies. Instead, with few exceptions, high-tech products exported by China are "assembled high-tech" products made of imported key parts and components. Lowskilled labor is the major input from China to these products, which are manufactured along global supply chains with many companies located in various countries involved in the production processes. As the global assembly center, Chinese workers generally perform the task of assembling various parts into ªnished products the lowest value-added segment in the production process. Conventional statistics do not differentiate between assembled high-tech products and independently manufactured products using all the necessary skills and technologies in the exporting country. Thus, whereas assembled high-tech products, such as smart phones and tablet devices, are cited as symbols of China's remarkable technology advancements, China actually contributes little to these ªnished products. Therefore, the sophistication of China's exports and the value of the high-tech exports are artiªcially inºated, and a false trade pattern is formed: China as a developing country exporting high-tech goods while the United States as a technology leader imports hightech products. A typical example is the Apple iPhone trade between China and the United States. In 2009 the iPhone added US$ 2.0 billion to China's high-tech exports to the United States, of which just 3.6 percent was created in China (Xing and Detert 2010) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section 3 brieºy outlines the growth and structure of China's high-tech exports; Section 4 analyzes the production patterns of high-tech products in China and uses the iPhone and laptop computers as cases to illustrate how conventional trade statistics distort the reality and the importance of adopting the value-added approach to accurately measure China's high-tech exports. Section 5 discusses the role of foreigninvested ªrms, in particular Taiwanese invested ªrms, in transforming China as the number one high-tech exporter. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
The dramatic sophistication of China's exports in such a short time has caught the attention of academic scholars. For example, Rodrik (2006) shows that China's export bundle had achieved the sophistication of a country with an income level three times its own. He argued that this special phenomenon cannot be explained simply by China's comparative advantage and natural endowments, but that the Chinese government's policies contributed substantially to the rapid upgrading of its export sophistication. Berger and Martin (2011) On the other hand, there are a few studies that investigate the sophistication of China's exports and disagree that China's export structure is special. Considering the diversity of China's regional development and the quality differentiation between products in the same classiªcation, Xu (2010) reexamines whether China is truly an outlier in terms of export sophistication and infers that China is less "special" in an across-country comparison of export sophistication. He argues that the relatively advanced development in the coastal region, where most of the high-tech exports are produced, can explain the relatively sophisticated export composition. Assche and Gangnes (2007) use the Reed Electronics Production Set to analyze the status and the progress of China's electronics production. They similarly ªnd no evidence to suggest that the sophistication of China's electronics production activities is higher than that implied by its income level. Sung (2007) argues that the assembly of DVD and other high-tech products from imported components are in fact lowtech activities, and therefore that it is misleading to conclude that China has been successful in climbing up the technological ladder by simply focusing on the gross export volumes of DVD and other high-tech products. Moreover, Athukorala and Yamashita (2008) point out that ICT products exported from China are "massmarket commodities" not "leading edge-technology products." Thus it is fundamentally ºawed to use China's ICT exports as a reference to conclude that its export sophistication had approached the level of the most advanced countries.
In terms of conventional trade statistics, China does stand out as a leading exporter in high-tech products. Most high-tech products, however, are manufactured along global supply chains and Chinese workers contribute to only parts of the produc-tion processes. The fundamental question is whether the gross value of high-tech exports remains an appropriate measure of the manufacturing capacity of high-tech products, and whether the technological sophistication of Chinese industries could be represented by assembled products in which they do not own intellectual property over key parts and components.
Reported growth of China's high-tech exports
China's ofªcial statistics on high-tech trade cover nine product categories: computers and telecommunications, life science technologies, electronics, computerintegrated manufacturing, aerospace, optical-electronics, biotechnology, materials, and others. The classiªcation is jointly published by China's Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Commerce. The high-tech category is comparable with U.S. trade statistics on advanced technology products. consistently had a trade deªcit in high-tech products, but the rapid expansion of high-tech exports turned this into a trade surplus. In 2010, the trade surplus in hightech products surged to US$ 79.6 billion, accounting for 43 percent of China's total trade surplus. fully become plugged into the global supply chain of manufacturing products, in particular ICT products. The signiªcant surge of China's ICT exports is largely attributed to the relocation and expansion of assembly capacity of multinational companies in China rather than indigenous technological breakthroughs. All Apple products are "designed in California by Apple and assembled in China." The popularity of i-products in the last decade has deªnitely elevated China's high-tech export volume and apparent sophistication in technology.
It is worth pointing out that trade in computers and telecommunication generated a US$ 262 billion surplus in 2010 whereas electronics showed a deªcit of US$ 119 billion. These ªgures provide some insight into China's so called high-tech trade.
Many parts and components used as intermediate inputs for products in the computer and telecommunications category are classiªed as electronics. This is one of the reasons for the deªcit in the electronics category. The large share and the surplus in the computer and telecommunication category is consistent with the fact that Chinese industries have been integrated at the low-value-added stage of the ICT production chain-assembly-and current trade statistics ascribe the entire value of assembled high-tech products to the country shipping the product abroad. This is one of the reasons behind the myth of China's number one status in high-tech exports. The following section builds on this point.
High-tech or assembled high-tech products?
Chinese Customs classify trade into two major categories: processing and ordinary trade. Processing trade involves importing parts and components as intermediate inputs, processing and assembling these intermediate inputs into ªnished products, and re-exporting the processed products to the global market. Processed exports use both imported and domestically produced parts and components. The share of domestically made contents determines the domestic value-added toward the exports. In 2010, processing trade accounted for over 40 percent of China's total trade. It is well known that processing exports have played a critical role in enhancing China's exports, peaking at 56 percent of China's total exports (Figure 2 ) (Xing 2012) . Compared with overall exports, processing exports are more pervasive in high-tech products because of the proliferation of global supply chains and the relatively advanced development in terms of production fragmentation.
Due to the lack of technological advantage, processing trade has been the major form of high-tech exports from China since the early 1990s (Figure 2 ). In 1993, China exported US$ 4 billion high-tech products, of which processing exports accounted for 71 percent. As more and more foreign ªrms relocated labor-intensive segments of their production chain to China and utilized China as an export platform, the share of processing exports in high-tech products grew dramatically to reach almost 90 percent in 2003. The share of processing exports declined slightly to 80 percent in 2010, but remains dominant in China's high-tech exports.
When these assembled high-tech products are shipped abroad, Chinese Customs classiªes them as high-tech exports, regardless of whether China's contribution is in labor or technology. The entire value of the assembled high-tech product is also credited to China, regardless of whether most of key parts and components are imported or domestically made. Therefore, the current trade statistics are misleading and greatly inºate the value of China's exports in high-tech products.
The iconic high-tech product iPhone is a typical example. Apple, one of the most innovative U.S. companies, designs and markets the iPhone. Apart from its software and product design, the production of iPhones primarily takes place outside the United States. 
Figure 2. Processing exports as share of high tech exports and total exports
Cirrius Logic. All iPhone components produced by these companies are shipped to Foxconn, a Taiwanese company located in Shenzhen, China, for assembly into ªnal products and then exported to the world market. It costs US$ 179 to make a 3G-iPhone, of which US$ 6.50, or about 3.6 percent, is the value-added by Chinese workers. The rest is attributed to Japan, Germany, Korea, the United States, and other countries. Under the current product classiªcation and trade statistics, the shipment of ready-to-use iPhones from China to the rest of the world is recorded as China's high-tech exports and the whole US$ 179 is credited to China whenever an iPhone is shipped abroad. As illustrated in Table 2 , most of the value associated with iPhone exports is actually attributed to imported parts and components from third countries and have nothing to do with China. Chinese workers simply put all these parts and components together and contribute just US$ 6.5 in value to each iPhone. The traditional way of measuring trade greatly exaggerates the value of China's iPhone exports, and thus the whole high-tech export volume. Source: Xing and Detert (2010) .
thus how a developing country such as China can export high-tech goods-at least according to the currently applied methodology for calculating trade statisticswhile the United States, the country that invented the iPhone, becomes an importer. It also illustrates why exporting assembled high-tech products may be irrelevant for technological progress and for understanding whether policies to promote high-tech industries are actually succeeding or not.
An interesting question that follows is:
To what extent do current trade statistics inºate China's high-tech export value? According to Xing and Detert (2010) , in 2009 China exported 25.7 million 3G-iPhones at US$ 179 per unit, thus the total iPhone export was estimated at US$ 4.6 billion, making up 1.2 percent of China's high-tech exports in the year. If the value-added approach is applied and only US$ 6.5 assembly cost is counted for each iPhone exported, the total value of iPhone exports would shrink to US$ 167 million, just 3.6 percent of the US$ 4.6 billion (Table 3) . Decomposing the iPhone production cost along the global supply chain therefore suggests that 96.4 percent of the gross value of China's iPhone exports was in fact re-exports of imported parts and components from the countries involved in the supply chain and should not be considered as domestically created value-added.
Laptop computers represent another major high-tech export product where Chinese companies have been deeply involved in the assembly process. China has turned into the number one laptop maker in the world. In 2009, it exported 108.5 million laptop PCs with an average selling price of US$ 484 per unit (MIC 2010). The gross value of laptop PC exports amounted to US$ 52.5 billion, contributing to 14 percent of its total high-tech exports. Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) estimate that assembly represents just 3 percent of the entire manufacturing cost of a laptop PC. Using this estimate as a reference, the value-added per laptop PC by Chinese workers would be US$ 14.5, and China's total value-added exports of laptop PC would drop to US$ 1.6 billion.
As the iPhone and laptop PC made up only 15 percent of China's high-tech exports, it is not appropriate to use the low valued-added in these two products to draw a Source: Xing and Detert (2010) , Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) , and author's estimations.
Note: a Assembling costs only.
general conclusion for all high-tech exports. However, given that 72 percent of hightech exports belong to the category of computer and communication technology and 80 percent are assembled with imported parts and components, there is no doubt that current trade statistics greatly exaggerate the value of high-tech exports. It is also misleading to claim that China is a global leader in high-tech trade. Trade statistics fail to identify the country origins of key technology contents and erroneously depict China as the number one high-tech exporter. To accurately describe China's position in global high-tech trade, a value-added approach should be used with a detailed country distribution over global value chains.
Even if the value-added approach is adopted, whether assembling high-tech products could be considered as advanced technology remains a question for debate. Assembling parts and components into ªnished products only requires low-skill labor and is no different from manufacturing other labor-intensive goods. The contribution of Chinese workers to these products is not advanced technology, but labor. High-tech products made of key imported parts and components should thus be called "assembled high-tech" and excluded from the high-tech classiªcation.
Who produces China's high-tech exports?
Another relevant question concerning China's high tech exports is: What are the major reasons for such a dramatic surge in high-tech exports from US$ 10 billion to US$ 492.4 billion in less than two decades? The simple answer is FDI and the extension of global supply chains of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and other economies to China.
Foreign-invested ªrms have dominated China's high-tech exports, as shown in Figure 3 , which decomposes high-tech exports according to the ownership of exporting ªrms. In 2002, foreign-invested ªrms produced 79 percent of high-tech exports and wholly foreign-owned ªrms produced 55 percent. In 2004, the share of foreigninvested ªrms grew to 86 percent; and in 2006 the share of wholly foreign-owned increased to 69 percent. Despite leveling off since then in percentage terms, the dominance of foreign-invested and foreign-owned ªrms in China's high-tech exports is clear.
High-tech exports of Sino-foreign joint ventures may result in technological advances for the Chinese partners of these ventures. The technology and production know-how used for producing exports of wholly foreign-owned ªrms belong to foreign investors and have nothing to do with Chinese indigenous ªrms, however. Technological spillover effects might lead to technology progress of local ªrms, although the extent to which domestic ªrms have beneªted from the presence of foreign investors in high-tech sectors is ambiguous. The share of indigenous ªrms in high-tech exports had been small, and even fell to 17 percent in 2010, 4 percentage points lower than in 1995. The relatively small share suggests that spillover effects remain limited, if any, and indigenous ªrms are far from being real competitors for the multinational ªrms of industrialized countries.
Among the foreign investors in China, Taiwanese IT companies have made a major contribution to the rapid expansion of China's high-tech exports in the ICT sector. As indicated in Table 1 , computers, telecommunication and electronics products represent the largest category in high-tech exports; close to 90 percent of China's high-tech exports belongs to this category. Relocation of production facilities from Taiwan to China has helped China emerge as a leading IT exporter in the world. The relocation simply transplanted the success of Taiwan's semiconductors to mainland China.
Since 1980, Taiwan has developed technology and production capacities in the semiconductor and information technology industry. Taiwanese companies have become the largest original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and original design manufacturers (ODM) for leading international IT ªrms such as IBM, Dell, Intel, and Sony. OEM and ODM are the major forms of production fragmentation in IT industries.
As production technologies in IT industries gradually mature and production processes are standardized, IT products become commodities rather than high-tech goods. It is then easy to divide production into segments and locate these segments in different countries.
In terms of global market share, in 2007 Taiwanese companies ranked number one in laptop computers with more than 90 million units, LCD monitors for PC with 117.5 million units, and motherboards with 149 million units; they also rank number two in desktop PC, servers, and digital cameras (Table 4) . Most of these IT products are sold in markets outside of Taiwan and mainland China. For instance, 95 percent of digital cameras, 92 percent of laptops, and 89 percent of servers are exported to overseas markets.
To strengthen their competitiveness and to lower production costs, Taiwanese companies have gradually relocated their production capacities to mainland China. This relocation immediately increased China's output in IT products and created an ICT growth myth. Speciªcally, by 2007, 98 percent of digital cameras made by Taiwan were produced in its mainland China factories; the same could be said of 97.8 percent of laptop computers, 57 percent of servers, and close to 92 percent of LCD monitors for PCs ( Therefore, it is FDI and the outsourcing activities of MNEs that transformed China into a world high-tech assembly center. Taiwanese IT companies, the leading global ICT maker, performed the most critical role in this transition. The abundant labor resource in mainland China and direct investment from Taiwan jointly made China a top exporter of various ICT products, such as laptop PCs, digital cameras and all i-products.
Concluding remarks: Myth and reality
Trade statistics portray that in just a decade China transformed from an exporter of labor-and resource-intensive products to the number one exporter of high-tech products. This paper has argued that China as the champion of high-tech products is a myth created by outdated trade statistics and incorrect product classiªcation. Prevailing trade statistics are inconsistent with trade based on global supply chains and mistakenly credit entire values of assembled high-tech products to China. China's real contribution to the reported 82 percent high-tech exports is labor not technology. High-tech products, mainly made of imported parts and components, should be called "Assembled High-tech." To accurately measure high-tech exports, the value-added approach should be utilized with detailed analysis on the value chains distributions across countries. Furthermore, if assembly is the only source of value-added by Chinese workers, in terms of technological contribution these assembled high-tech exports are indifferent to labor-intensive products, and so they should be excluded from the high-tech classiªcation.
MNEs, in particular Taiwanese IT ªrms in China, have performed an important role in the rapid expansion of high-tech exports. The trend of production fragmentation and outsourcing activities of MNEs in information and communication technology has beneªted China signiªcantly, because of its huge labor endowment. The small share of indigenous ªrms in high-tech exports implies that China has yet to become a real competitor of the United States, EU, and Japan. That China is the number one high-tech exporter is thus a myth rather than a reality.
